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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

/

Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20030554-CA

vs.
KYLE JOSEPH LEHMAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his sentence to two consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen
years entered pursuant to guilty pleas to two counts of sexual abuse of a child, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (1999), in the Third Judicial
District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2003).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Should this Court assume that the sentencing court failed to consider mitigating
factors when it sentenced a sex offender with a ten-year history of abusing children to
consecutive prison terms, where the imposition of consecutive terms only increased the
minimum term from one year to two years?
A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v.
Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 8,40 P.3d 626. "An abuse of discretion results when the judge fails to
consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is clearly excessive." State.
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quotations omitted).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This appeal requires the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003), attached
as Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In two separate cases, defendant pled guilty to one count each of sexually abusing a
child (R552. 34-41, 43-44 63; R394. 34-43, 65).

After reviewing the Presentence

Investigation Report (PSI), the court sentenced defendant, in a joint sentencing hearing, to
two consecutive prison terms of one-to-fifteen years (R552.45-46,64:3; R394.44-45,66:3).
Defendant timely appealed, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered
him to serve his sentences consecutively rather than concurrently (R552. 47; R394. 46).
Aplt. Br. at 10. This Court consolidated the cases for purposes of appeal (R394. 62).]
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
When defendant was thirteen, he tried to have anal intercourse with his eight year-old
foster brother (R552.62A:2,10). During that same time, he sexually abused his six year-old

1

The State will follow defendant's format in citing to the separate records. See Aplt.
Br. at 2, n.l. Citations to the record in district court case number 031901552 will begin
"R552," and citations to the record in district court case number 031901394 will begin
"R394." The district court held joint change of plea and sentencing hearings, so the State
will only cite to the transcripts from district court case number 031901552, which are twR552.
63" and "R552. 64," respectively.
2
The facts are taken primarily from the PSI, which the trial court reviewed before
sentencing defendant (R552. 64:1). Defendant offered no corrections to the PSI (R552.
64:2). See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b) (2003) ("If a party fails to challenge the
accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be
considered to be waived.")
2

foster sister over a four-month period by fondling her, performing oral sex on her, and
digitally penetrating her (R552 62A:2,10). Defendant spent his subsequent teenage years in
several residential facilities (R552. 62A:2, 8, 10). He was twice removed from residential
facilities for "sexually acting out" with other residents (R552. 62A: 10). The second episode
resulted in defendant's placement in a "lockdown facility" (R552. 62A:10). One of the
episodes resulted in a referral to juvenile court for sexual abuse (R552. 62A:7).
Although defendant, now twenty-four, has aged, his victims have not (R552. 62A: 12). In September 2002, defendant molested his step-nieces, five-year-old S.H., and fouryear-old CM. (R552. 62A:3-6). The abuse occurred at C.M.'s house while other adults were
home (R552. 62A:3-6). Defendant took both girls into a room, showed them his penis, and
made them touch it (R552. 62A:3-4, 6). He then vaginally penetrated both girls with his
finger (R522. 62A:3-4, 6). C.M.'s fourteen-year-old cousin, R.H., witnessed defendant
fondling S.H. (R552. 62A:6, 11).
Later in the month, defendant again molested S.H. in her home (R552. 62A:3-4, 6).
Defendant made her touch his erect penis (R552. 62A:4). He then vaginally penetrated her
with his finger and performed oral sex on her (R522. 62A:4, 6). He also made her perform
oral sex on him, after which he ejaculated (R552. 62A:4, 6-7).
Kristie Greene of the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) reported that she
has "rarely seen a perpetrator so adept and brazen at drawing his victims away from people
and engaging them in in-depth sexual behavior knowing there were other people in the home
and even on the other side of the door" (R552. 62A:11). She concluded from defendant's

3

actions that he is a "more advanced" perpetrator and that his behavior would likely continue
absent intervention (R552. 62A: 11).
Defendant said he molested the girls because he "believed that [he] could get away
with it" (R552. 62A:7). When the police and his father first confronted defendant about the
abuse, he denied it (R552. 62A:4, 7). Defendant also denied sexually abusing anyone in his
youth (R552. 62A:4). Defendant later admitted the behavior and gave Adult Probation and
Parole (AP&P) a full account of the abuse (R552. 62A:6-7).
After the State formally charged defendant with two counts of sexual abuse of a child,
a psychologist interviewed defendant to evaluate his amenability to pre-trial release (R552.
23-24). The psychologist recommended supervised release noting that defendant had not
been implicated in any new cases since molesting S.H. and CM. and that defendant's last
involvement in child sex abuse was nine years previous to the current charges (R552.23-24).
The psychologist specifically noted, however, that he did not consider defendant's juvenile
record in assessing the risk of pre-trial release, because defendant's juvenile BCI rap sheet
was blank (R552. 23).3
Defendant pled guilty, and the court ordered a PSI (R552.43). AP&P prepared a PSI
that included an official summary of the offenses, defendant's version of the offenses,
defendant's criminal history including his juvenile record, defendant's personal history
including his family history, sexual history, and sexual treatment history, and an evaluative

The psychologist's source for defendant's juvenile record was apparently defendant
himself and the DCFS reports included in pre-trial discovery.
4

assessment. The PSI recommended that the court order defendant to serve consecutive
prison terms in the Utah State Prison (R552. 62A: 1). In recommending consecutive prison
terms, the AP&P investigator wrote:
[Defendant was in a position of trust and violated that trust when he seized
what he said was an opportunity, and sexually abused his four-year-old niece
and five-year-old niece. He was brazen in his behavior because both assaults
occurred when there were other people in the home and after one of the sexual
assaults, he returned to where the rest of the family were and played with the
victim as if nothing had happened. . . . Despite his claims, [that] he has not
sexually abused anyone for 10 years, one is inclined to believe there are other
victims who have not come forward. Even if there were not, he has started
sexually abusing children again and it is a concern that as he has gotten older,
his victims have not. There is no doubt there will be more victims if he is not
removed from the community for a long period of time and placed into
treatment.
(R552. 62A:2).
At the sentencing hearing, the court noted that it had received and reviewed the PSI
(R552. 64:1). Defense counsel recommended concurrent sentences and pointed out that
defendant was young, had good attitude, and was amenable to treatment (R552. 64:2). The
State recommended only that the court follow the recommendations of the PSI (R552.64:3).
The court gave its opinion that defendant's crimes were "repulsive" and "reprehensible," that
defendant had engaged in a "pattern of activity" and "violated the trust of these small four
and five-year-old girls" (R552. 64:3) The court concluded that defendant was "a danger to
society" and "must be placed in a confined setting so that [he] cannot prey on small children
in this society anymore" (R552. 64:3-4). The court sentenced defendant to two consecutive
one-to-fifteen year prison terms and recommended that defendant receive sex-offender
therapy in prison (R552. 45-46, 64:3; R394. 44-45).
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Trial courts have wide sentencing discretion. While they must consider all legally
relevant factors, they need not make a record of their consideration of those factors unless
required by statute. Where the court is not required to and does not make a record of its
consideration of the legally relevant factors, a reviewing court may assume that the court
considered those factors. In such a case, the reviewing court will overturn the sentence only
if the sentence is inherently unfair or clearly excessive.
In the instant case, the sentencing court was not required and did not make a record of
its consideration of the factors.

It is reasonable, however, to assume that the court

considered all the legally relevant factors because the PSI, which the court stated it read,
contained all the information the court needed to consider those factors. The actual sentence
permits the Board of Pardons and Parole to parole defendant from two second degree
felonies after only two years. The sentence is therefore not inherently unfair or clearly
excessive and should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
Defendant's sole claim is that the sentencing court abused it's discretion when it
ordered him to serve his prison terms consecutively. Aplt. Br. at 10. Specifically, defendant
asserts that the court failed to adequately weigh all relevant mitigating factors, including
defendant's extreme remorse for his actions, his significant rehabilitative needs, and a
psychologist's opinion that defendant was fit for pre-trial release. Aplt. Br. at 12-15.

6

THE SENTENCING COURT IS PRESUMED TO HAVE CONSIDERED
THE LEGALLY RELEVANT FACTORS WHERE THE COURT READ
THE PSI AND IMPOSED A SENTENCE THAT IS NOT INHERENTLY
UNFAIR OR CLEARLY EXCESSIVE
District courts have "wide latitude and discretion in sentencing." State v. Helms, 2002
UT 12, H 8, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)).
"Generally, [appellate courts] will reverse a trial court's sentencing decision only if it is an
abuse of the judge's discretion." Id. "A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing when,
among other things, it 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors'" Id. (quoting State v.
McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990)). A sentencing court is not required, however,
to state on the record its consideration of each legally relevant factor. See Helms, 2002 UT
12, If 11. Rather, this Court may assume that the sentencing court actually considered the
factors unless (1) an ambiguity of facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute
explicitly provides that written findings must be made, or (3) a prior case states that findings
on an issue must be made. See id.; State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997).
When a court is not required to make a record of its consideration of the legally relevant
factors, the sentence will be overturned "only when it is inherently unfair or clearly
excessive." Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 14.
In the instant case, the sentencing court ordered defendant to serve his sentences
consecutively (R552.45-46,64:3; R394.44-45). "In determining whether state offenses are
to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances
of the offenses, the number of victims, and history, character and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). No statute or case required the court to
7

make a record of its consideration of those factors. The court concluded on the record at the
sentencing hearing only that the gravity and pattern of defendant's crimes rendered him a
"danger to society" (R552. 64:3-4). This Court may therefore assume that the trial court
considered all the legally relevant factors. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, Tf 11. Such an
assumption is reasonable. The court noted on the record that it had reviewed the PSI (R552.
64:1). The PSI contained everything the court needed to "consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). Specifically, the PSI
included an official summary of the offenses, defendant's version of the offenses,
defendant's criminal history including his juvenile record, defendant's personal history
including his family history, sexual history, and sexual treatment history, and an evaluative
assessment by the AP&P investigator (R552. 62A).
Defendant claims that "simply being aware of sentencing information is not enough."
Aplt. Br. at 12. "The sentencing judge must actually 'take[e] [the information] into
account.'" Aplt. Br. at 12 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297,
1300 (Utah 1993)). However, where the trial court is not required to make a record of its
consideration of the legally relevant factors, and it does not actually make such a record, this
Court assumes the trial court considered all the relevant factors unless the sentence is
"inherently unfair or clearly excessive." Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 11, 14.
In support of his claim defendant relies on State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998),
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989),
8

and State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985). Those cases all, however, involved
circumstances where Utah law required the sentencing court to make a record of its
consideration of each legally relevant factor or where the court was not required to make a
record, but did. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 15 (distinguishing Galli because the courts in
Galli provided a detailed written explanation for the sentences they imposed); Strunk,846
P.2d at 1299 (noting that Utah statutory law requires court to make record of its reasons for
imposing minimum mandatory sentences for child kidnapping); State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d at
1136 (noting that court discussed each of the legally relevant factors and discussed
defendant's compliance); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d at 118-19 (noting that sentencing court
stated on record at hearing what evidence it considered and how it weighed the evidence).
The instant case is more analogous to State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12. In that case,
Helms pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual assault and three counts of dealing in
harmful material to a minor. Id. at ^f 1. The court sentenced Helms to two prison terms of
three years to life for the aggravated sexual assault counts and three prison terms of zero to
five years for the dealing in harmful material to a minor counts. Id. The court ordered the
sentences to run consecutively. Id. In imposing the sentences and ordering them to run
consecutively, the court stated only (1) that it had reviewed the PSI and a letter from Helms'
sister and (2) that defendant's actions were "completely outside the realm of a normal
situation." Id. at ]f 6. On review, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the record contained no
explanation of the trial court's weighing of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Id. at ffl[ 12, 15. The court held that it "must therefore defer to the trial court's judgment
9

absent a showing by [Helms] that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors/'
A/, at K 15.
As in Helms, the record here contains no explanation of the trial court's weighing of
the aggravating and mitigating factors (R552. 64:3-4). The trial court stated only that
defendant's crimes were "reprehensible" and that defendant needed to be "placed in a
confined setting" (R552. 64:3-4). This Court must therefore assume that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion unless defendant's sentence is "inherently unfair or clearly
excessive." Helms, 2002 UT 12, ^ 14.
Defendant points out several mitigating factors including his candor with
investigators, his remorse and empathy for the victims, his youth, his willingness to undergo
treatment, and his rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Br. at 13-15. He claims the court ignored these
factors and focused only on the seriousness of the crime. Aplt. Br. at 16. Defendant's claim
ignores the wide discretion courts have in sentencing. See Helms, 2002 UT 12, % 8.
"Generally, [appellate courts] will reverse a trial court's sentencing decision only if it is an
abuse of the judge's discretion." Id. There is no evidence that the court ignored the
mitigating factors—it simply was unpersuaded by them. Thus, unless the sentence is
"inherently unfair or clearly excessive," this Court must affirm defendant's sentence. Id. at ^
14.
Defendant asserts that consecutive sentences have "doom[ed] [him] to lengthy
incarceration with little hope of timely addressing the causes of his criminal conduct." Aplt.
Br. at 18. In fact, the consecutive sentencing order only changed defendant's minimum
10

sentence from one year to two. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(8).4 The order thus gives
the Board of Pardons substantial discretion to release defendant in as early as two years or, if
defendant proves averse to reform and a continuing danger to society, to continue his
confinement for up to thirty years. Defendant's sentence is not, therefore, "inherently unfair
or clearly excessive." Helms, 2002 UT 12, U 14. Defendant began sexually abusing younger
children at a very early age (R552. 62A:2, 10). The abuse appears to have continued though
his teenage years (R552. 62A:7-10). While there may have been a period of remission,
defendant has began abusing young children again (R552. 62A:3-6). Both the prosecutor
and AP&P concluded that defendant needed to be incarcerated and treated (R552. 62A:2, 7)
Consecutive sentences provide a just punishment with flexibility to accommodate
defendant's response to treatment and ability to change.
Defendant claims that the sentencing court "failed to consider the psychologist's
evaluation of Mr. Lehman's fitness for pre-trial release." Aplt. Br. at 12. No statute or case
4

Utah Code Ann. 76-3-401(8) explains how to calculate consecutively imposed
sentences and reads, in part:
[T]he Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has
been committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly
imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms
Thus, defendant will serve his two one-to-fifteen year prison terms as if he had
been sentenced to a single term of two-to-thirty years.
11

requires a sentencing court to consider such a report. The report's summary conclusions of
defendant's character and history are repetitive of what is contained in the PSI (R552. 2324). The psychologist's recommendation of supervised release is inapplicable because it was
made before defendant confessed to sexually abusing two small girls and without
consideration of defendant's juvenile record (R552. 23-24). In short, the report is not, as
defendant claims, a mitigating factor because it contains the same information as the PSI,
with less detail, and the psychologist's recommendation was made without consideration of
all the facts.
Defendant's claim is therefore meritless.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's sentence.
Respectfully submitted this l&

day of February 2004.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
• & = >

MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
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Matthew D. Bates
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum

76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the
order of judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to
each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative
needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively
if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole,
unless the court finds and states on the record t h a t consecutive sentencing
would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request,
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as
provided under Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are
imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect
of consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the
Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly
imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum
terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of
where the person is located.

